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Juvenile Miranda Waivers: A Reasonable Alternative
to the Totality of the Circumstances Approach
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court emphasized in In re Gault “that admissions
and confessions of juveniles require special caution,” 1 noting that “the
greatest care” should be given to assure that the juvenile gives these
statements voluntarily with full knowledge of his or her rights. 2
Unfortunately, the standard used today by juvenile courts to decide
whether juveniles have made a “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” 3
Miranda waiver often does not meet the requirements set forth
in Gault.
This Comment will explore the safeguards that are currently in
place to ensure juveniles’ Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination is protected. Part I gives a brief history of the juvenile
court system, including its origin and the philosophy behind its
creation. Part II looks at the approach taken by today’s juvenile courts
to guarantee that Miranda waivers given by juveniles are “knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.” 4 The next three parts identify and explore
three problems with the current approach to juvenile Miranda
waivers. Part III explores why treating a juvenile’s waiver of rights the
same as that of an adult may not be the best approach. Part IV explains
that juveniles lack the mental abilities needed to make a valid waiver,
and Part V assesses how the current approach used to ensure a valid
waiver is inconsistently applied throughout the juvenile court system.
Finally, Part VI will suggest a new approach that will better protect
juveniles’ Miranda rights: Juveniles should be guaranteed the
opportunity to consult an attorney before waiving their rights. This
approach will provide juveniles a heightened degree of protection and
ensure juvenile Miranda waivers are valid.

1.
2.
3.
4.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967).
Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Id.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE COURT
The idea that the law should protect children and treat them
different than adults is an old concept. Blackstone’s Commentaries
state that in order to commit a crime, a person must both (1) intend
to commit a crime and (2) do an unlawful act. 5 According to
Blackstone, children under the age of seven were too young to have
the intent necessary to commit a crime, while children older than
fourteen were treated the same as adults in criminal convictions. 6
Blackstone further explained that for children between the ages of
seven and fourteen, criminal liability depended on whether the court
determined that the child understood the difference between right
and wrong. 7 Children who possessed such an understanding were
deemed to be capable of having the intent necessary to commit a crime
and could be sentenced as an adult, even if that sentence
included execution. 8
The American legal system followed Blackstone’s ideas on age and
intent until the late nineteenth century, when the legal treatment of
children began to change as part of an expanding child-saving
movement. In 1891, the Chicago Women’s Club recommended to
the Illinois legislature that a separate juvenile court system be created
to deal with problem children. 9 However, it was not until 1899 that
the Club, with the sponsorship of the Chicago Bar Association,
presented a juvenile court bill to the Illinois legislature. 10 The Club’s
efforts were successful, and the Illinois juvenile code passed in 1899,
mandating the following provisions for the legal processing of
problem children:

5. A.B.A., PART 1: THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (2007), http
://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authche
ckdam.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. DAVID MUSICK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY 25 (1995).
10. Id.
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•

The state could intervene and act as parens patriae, 11
or guardian, of the child. 12

•

A new tribunal would be created to “hear cases
involving problem children under the age of
sixteen.” 13

•

Informal and noncriminal procedures were to be used
by the court so that remedial, preventative, and nonpunitive justice could be given on an individual basis. 14

•

Judges would “furnish ‘parent-like’ care, custody, and
discipline” to the children. 15

The idea of this new juvenile court was well-received, and within
twenty-five years of the establishment of the first juvenile court in
Cook County, Illinois, “most states had set up [similar] juvenile court
systems.” 16 The driving philosophy behind the juvenile court system
was that cases involving adolescents should be civil (rather than
criminal) in nature, and that the legal system should guide and
rehabilitate juveniles into responsible and law-abiding adults. 17
It is important to note that because early juvenile courts took on
a parental role in guiding wayward juveniles, the courts were informal
and had few mandatory procedural rules. At the same time, juvenile
courts exercised tremendous power—judges had the right to remove
children from their homes and place them in juvenile reform “schools”
as part of the rehabilitation process. 18 Indeed, this informal and

11. The doctrine of parens patriae means that the state steps in and acts as the “provider
of protection to those unable to care for themselves.” Parens patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
12. MUSICK, supra note 9, at 25.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. A.B.A., supra note 5, at 5.
17. Id.
18. Id. Judge Julian Mack, one of the first judges to preside over the juvenile court,
described the goals of the juvenile court:
The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be made to know that
he is face to face with the power of the state, but he should at the same time, and
more emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude. The
ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place in such hearings. The judge on
a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar, can never evoke a proper
sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at his side, where he can on occasion
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unregulated approach to the juvenile courts continued until the
Supreme Court agreed to hear In re Gault in 1967.
Gerald Gault was a fifteen-year-old boy who was found to have
made “Lewd Phone Calls” to Mrs. Cook, his neighbor. 19 Mrs. Cook
made a verbal complaint to the police about the phone calls, which
resulted in Gerald being picked up by the police and “taken to the
Children’s Detention Home.” 20 Gerald’s parents were never notified
that he had been arrested, nor were they served a petition about the
hearing that was to be held to decide Gerald’s fate. 21 Mrs. Cook, the
complainant, was not present at the hearing, no one was sworn in, and
“no transcript or recording was made.” 22 At the end of the hearing,
the judge said he would “think about” the issues of the case and sent
Gerald back to the Detention Home. 23 In the end, the judge
committed Gerald to the State Industrial School, a juvenile reform
school, until the age of twenty-one. 24 If Gerald had been an adult and
convicted of the same crime, he would have been fined between five
and fifty dollars, or he could have been sentenced to no more than
two months of imprisonment. 25
Gerald’s parents petitioned for his release, arguing that Gerald had
been denied due process of law and that his constitutional right to a
fair trial had been violated. 26 The Supreme Court ruled in the Gaults’
favor and held that juveniles subject to delinquency hearings were
entitled to a notice of charges against them, the right to legal counsel,
the right against self-incrimination, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, the right to a transcript of the proceedings, and the
right to appellate review to ensure due process and fair hearings.27
Justice Black emphasized in his concurring opinion that

put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing none
of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work.
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909).
19. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
20. Id. at 4–5.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id. at 8–9.
26. Id. at 9–10.
27. Id. at 10.
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[w]here a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged,
and convicted for violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by
the State to be confined for six years, I think the Constitution
requires that he be tried in accordance with the guarantees of all the
provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 28

The Gault decision brought several sweeping changes to the
juvenile court system, causing some advocates of less rigid and
informal juvenile hearings to fear that the Gault decision blurred the
lines between juvenile and criminal court proceedings. Time would
demonstrate that these fears proved unfounded, as the juvenile courts
have continued to operate as civil courts post-Gault, with a focus on
rehabilitation and acting in the best interest of the child. Among the
rights guaranteed to juveniles through Gault, is the right against selfincrimination, also known as the right to remain silent. 29 Today, courts
use the totality of the circumstances approach to decide the validity of
a juvenile’s waiver of the right to remain silent.
II. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH
As stated above, the decision of In re Gault brought several
sweeping changes to the Juvenile Court system. In deciding that
“neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
adults alone,” 30 the Supreme Court held that juveniles have
constitutionally protected rights to a notice of the charges, counsel,
confrontation and cross-examination, protection against selfincrimination, “a transcript of the proceedings,” and appellate
review. 31 With regard to a juvenile’s right against self-incrimination,
the Court further “emphasized that admissions and confessions of
juveniles require special caution.” 32 Additionally, the Court
admonished that confessions given without the presence of counsel
should be given “the greatest care . . . to assure that the admission was
voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested,
but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights.” 33 To

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 61 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 42–49.
Id. at 13 (majority opinion).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
Id. at 55.
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safeguard against juveniles waiving the right to counsel and confessing
without understanding their rights, the juvenile court implemented
the same waiver procedures that are currently in place for adults.
The year before the Gault decision, in Miranda v. Arizona, the
Supreme Court established police procedural guidelines that
protected a person accused of a crime from self-incrimination during
a custodial interrogation. 34 The Miranda Court established that
before questioning starts in a custodial interrogation, accused persons
must be made aware of their right to remain silent, that anything they
say can be used against them, their right to have counsel present
during the questioning, and their right to have counsel appointed to
them if they cannot afford to retain counsel for themselves. 35 These
Miranda warnings, intended to protect the Constitutional rights set
forth in the Fifth Amendment, have become a fundamental part of
criminal jurisprudence with guaranteed protection. To determine
whether statements made by the accused during interrogation are
admissible, courts investigate the totality of the circumstances
encompassing the interrogation to assess whether the accused
“voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently” 36 waived his or her rights
before making statements to the police. 37
Over ten years after Miranda, the Supreme Court decided in Fare
v. Michael C. that the “totality-of-the-circumstances approach is
adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where
interrogation of juveniles is involved.” 38 The Court stressed that the
totality approach would not only permit but mandate examination of
all of the circumstances surrounding an interrogation of a juvenile.39
According to the Court, this investigation into the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation must include an “evaluation of the
juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence,
and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given
to him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the
consequences of waiving those rights.” 40

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 479.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
Id.
Id.
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It would seem that no one would be able to better determine if
juveniles have “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently” waived their
Miranda rights than juvenile courts who have the experience and
expertise in dealing with juveniles. Yet the application of the totality
of the circumstances approach appears to be flawed, considering that
a staggering ninety percent of juveniles who are arrested for alleged
felonies choose to waive their Miranda rights after they are informed
of them. 41 Among juveniles under the age of fourteen, the number
who waive their rights jumps to ninety-five percent. 42
In light of these troubling statistics, this Comments identifies
three main flaws with the totality of the circumstances approach to the
waiver of Miranda rights by juveniles. First, the totality method treats
juveniles as adults, which is contrary to the philosophy driving the
juvenile system. Second, juveniles lack the mental capacity to
understand what it means to waive their constitutionally protected
rights. 43 And third, judges are unable to weigh the factors considered
in the totality approach with consistency and regularity.

41. A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 39, 53 (1970) (reporting that over 90% of the juveniles whom police interrogated waived
their rights); J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical
Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 337–39 (1977)
(noting that juveniles invoked their rights in about 10% of cases compared to the 40% of adults
who invoked their rights); Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent
Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas, Communication with Attorneys, and Appeals, 29 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 253, 261 (2005) (reporting that in a retrospective study of delinquents held
in detention, only approximately thirteen percent reported that they asserted their right
to silence).
42. Grisso & Pomicter, supra note 41, at 337.
43. “[B]asic research on cognitive and psychosocial development suggests that some
youths will manifest deficits in legally relevant abilities similar to deficits seen in adults with
mental disabilities, but for reasons of immaturity rather than mental disorder.” Thomas Grisso
et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities
as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 334 (2003). In trying to ascertain a juvenile’s
competency to stand trial in comparison to adults, the
[a]bilities associated with adjudicative competence were assessed among 927
adolescents in juvenile detention facilities and community settings. Adolescents’
abilities were compared to those of 466 young adults in jails and in the community.
Participants at 4 locations across the United States completed a standardized measure
of abilities relevant for competence to stand trial (the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool—Criminal Adjudication) as well as a new procedure for assessing
psychosocial influences on legal decisions often required of defendants (MacArthur
Judgment Evaluation).
Id. at 333.
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III. IMPROPRIETY OF ADULT APPROACHES IN THE
JUVENILE SYSTEM
The philosophy underlying the formation of the juvenile court
system is that children are not adults and should not be held to an
adult standard. 44 The idea is that children do not have the malice
necessary to commit criminal acts, and any such acts committed by
children are due to behavioral problems that are outside of their
control. 45 Thus, rather than subjecting juveniles to criminal
punishment, the State, through the juvenile court system, steps in
when needed and acts as parens patriae to provide for the nurture,
guidance, supervision, and needs of the child. 46
Supreme Court jurisprudence has continually recognized that
children should be treated as children rather than miniature adults.
The Court has stated that juvenile courts “are to provide measures of
guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society,
not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.” 47 The Court
did not formally impose the adult totality of the circumstances
approach on juveniles until Fare, even though the belief that juveniles
who commit crimes should be treated differently from adult criminals
was evident in pre-Fare cases involving the constitutionally protected
right against self-incrimination. The pre-Fare cases of Haley v. Ohio48
and Gallegos v. Colorado 49 prove instructive to this point, the Court
having ruled in both instances that an offender’s age is vital in deciding
how the law administers justice.
In 1948, long before Miranda’s sweeping changes, the Supreme
Court heard Haley v. Ohio. 50 The case involved the murder confession
of a fifteen-year-old boy. After examining the facts surrounding the
boy’s arrest, questioning, and confession, the Court emphasized:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature
man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child—an easy victim
of the law—is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must

44. A.B.A., supra note 5, at 5.
45. Philip Rich, The Juvenile Justice System and Its Treatment of the Juvenile: An Overview,
17 ADOLESCENTS 141, 142 (1982).
46. Id.
47. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
48. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
49. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
50. Haley, 332 U.S. at 596.
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be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race.
He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. 51

The Court further stressed that it could not “indulge [in the]
assumption” that one of such a young age could fully appreciate his
constitutional rights without the advice of counsel. 52
The Court’s view that juveniles lack the understanding and
maturity of adults and, therefore, that they cannot be held to adult
standards was highlighted again almost fifteen years later in Gallegos v.
Colorado. 53 Gallegos dealt with the admissibility of inculpatory
statements made by a fourteen-year-old boy who, “immediately”
upon being picked up by the police for questioning, confessed to
robbing and beating an elderly man. 54 Citing Haley, the Court found
the suspect’s youth to be a “crucial factor” 55 to the admissibility the
boy’s statements. Consequently, the Court ultimately decided the
boy’s confession was inadmissible due to the immaturity characteristic
to his age. As Justice Douglas explained, a youth of fourteen, “no
matter how sophisticated . . . is not equal to the police in knowledge
and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers
being recorded.” 56 Additionally, such a youth “is unable to know how
to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
constitutional rights.” 57 Douglas further emphasized that such a boy
“cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and
knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.” 58
Two more recent cases involving the rights of juveniles, Roper v.
Simmons 59 and Miller v. Alabama, 60 show the Supreme Court’s
continued insistence that children are not merely miniature adults and
should not be held to the same standards as adults. In Roper, the
Court determined that sentencing a juvenile offender below the age
of eighteen to the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 599.
Id. at 601.
Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 49.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 61 The Court held that
juveniles are categorically less culpable than adult criminals for three
reasons. First, “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young.” 62 Second, “juveniles are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure.” 63 And third, “the character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.” 64 Each of these three
reasons given by the Court relates to juveniles’ lack of maturity and
development because of their youth. This reasoning mirrors the
philosophy behind the development of the juvenile court system—
juveniles should not be held to the same standards as adults.
The Court again advanced the idea that juveniles should not be
held to an adult standard when it decided in Miller that juveniles may
not be given mandatory life imprisonment without parole. 65 Citing
Roper, the Court reaffirmed that “children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing,” explaining that
“juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for
reform.” 66 Because juveniles do not have the same experience and
maturity as adults, it makes sense that they should also not be viewed
as having the same accountability as their adult counterparts.
Cases like Haley, Gallegos, Roper, and Miller all demonstrate the
Supreme Court’s embrace of the philosophy behind the development
of the juvenile court system—children are not sufficiently developed
or mature to be treated as adults. Given the Court’s well-established
and enduring stance on this issue, it seems illogical that juveniles
should be held to adult standards when it comes to something as
important as waiving the right against self-incrimination.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

204

Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
Id. at 2464.
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IV. CHILDREN LACK THE MENTAL ABILITY TO WAIVE
THEIR RIGHTS
In order for a Miranda waiver to be admissible, the waiver must
be made “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” 67 Juvenile waivers,
however, present at least two significant problems. First, juveniles’
may lack the capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver
because their brains are still developing. 68 Second, adolescents are
more susceptible and vulnerable to coercion because they are still
maturing in their psychosocial development. 69 The combination of
juveniles’ still-developing brains and immature psychosocial abilities
calls into question whether juveniles are capable of making a voluntary,
knowing and intelligent Miranda waiver.
An adolescent’s inability to make a valid waiver of Miranda rights
may have less to do with learning and education and more to do with
the fact that the adolescent brain is still undergoing growth and
change. 70 Due to a still maturing and developing brain, juveniles likely
lack the ability to make a knowing and intelligent decision about their
rights. With the advent of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
scientists have been able to study and better understand the growth
and development of the living brain. 71 Using MRI, scientists have
shown that changes in the volume of grey and white matter of the
brain take place throughout childhood, adolescence, and into
early adulthood. 72
67. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
68. See Grisso, supra note 43, at 356–57; see generally Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S.
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility,
and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003).
69. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 68, at 1014–15.
70. Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect
Children from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 WIS.
L. REV. 431, 440.
While the growing body of research in brain development is still too young to make
definitive correlations between brain development and reasoning ability or behavior,
what is known strongly suggests that adolescents do not think like adults because they
are physiologically incapable of doing so. Adolescents do not have the same access to
their frontal lobes, nor the same ability to integrate the functions of different regions
of their brains as adults. Hence, they have a lesser ability to reason and interpret
information than adults have.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
71. Tomáš Paus, Mapping Brain Maturation and Cognitive Development During
Adolescence, 9 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIS. 60, 60–67 (2005).
72. Id. at 61–62.
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That the adolescent brain is continually evolving may explain why
the teenage years are full of emotional upheaval, risk taking,
experimentation, and overall change. 73 The MIT Young Adult
Development Project was created in 2005 to scrutinize and examine
the increasing research on changes that take place during adolescence.
“Defining young adulthood as the years between 18 and 25, the
project focused on identifying research conclusions about which there
is widespread agreement across disciplines and researchers . . . .” 74 The
Project concluded that adolescence is a time where the brain goes
through “considerable growth and pruning,” 75 and teenagers “show a
heightened desire for emotional intensity, and for the thrills,
excitement, adventures, and risk-taking that are likely to generate
high emotion.” 76
Accordingly, the adolescent years are a period of immense change
for not only the physical characteristics attributed to puberty, but also
the mental prowess of the brain, including the ability to make
informed decisions. 77 Consider how myelination—the process that
covers nerve fibers with white matter, insulating the nerve fibers and
allowing signals to be transmitted more efficiently through the brain—
is far from complete during adolescence and continues until early
adulthood. 78 Because “[s]mooth flow of information throughout the
brain depends to a great extent on the structural integrity and maturity
of white-matter pathways[,]” 79 the development of which is still
incomplete, adolescents tend to have a lower ability to problem solve,
think ahead, assess risks, and regulate emotions relative to adults. 80
While a juvenile’s brain can still perform such tasks, it takes much
more effort for the brain to do so and, hence, the brain is less likely to
complete the tasks. 81 Teenagers are not often known for their
thorough reasoning, and it seems that science now has sufficient
evidence to explain this phenomenon. Teenagers’ possible reduced

73. A. RAE SIMPSON, MIT YOUNG ADULT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 4–11 (2008),
http://hrweb.mit.edu/worklife/youngadult/youngadult.pdf.
74. Id. at 2.
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 6–7.
78. Id. at 10.
79. Paus, supra note 71, at 61.
80. See Simpson, supra note 73, at 10.
81. See id.
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ability for thorough reasoning could also hinder them from making a
valid waiver of their rights.
Juveniles who are asked to waive their Miranda rights must be
able to not only understand the meaning of their rights, but also
imagine the consequences of a decision to waive or invoke their
rights. 82 This means that in order for a juvenile to make a “knowing
and intelligent” waiver, he or she needs to be able to apply
counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thinking is the “ability to
imagine alternative outcomes and understand the consequences of
those outcomes.” 83 Research on the adolescent brain and its reasoning
ability by Abigail Baird and Jonathan Fugelsang, professors in the
Department of Psychological and Brain Science at Dartmouth
College, is instructive. Baird and Fugelsang found that an adolescent’s
ability to think counterfactually is hindered because of the stilldeveloping white brain matter around the nerve fibers, which inhibits
information from traveling as smoothly between areas of the
adolescent brain as it does in a fully matured adult. 84 The study
further clarifies:
[I]t is the interaction of continued experience and refinements in the
adolescent brain that enable the emergence of counterfactual
reasoning, as well as the appreciation of consequences, in the absence
of actual experience. What the evidence . . . suggests is that it may
be physically impossible for adolescents to engage in counterfactual
reasoning, and as a result of this [adolescents] are often unable to
effectively foresee the possible consequences of their actions. 85

In short, because juveniles’ brains are, in many cases, unable to process
counterfactual scenarios due to lack of neurological maturity, they may
not be able to make the informed reasoning necessary to knowingly
waive their Miranda rights.
Not only is there evidence that juveniles lack the brain
development necessary to make a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of
their rights, but juveniles may also lack the vocabulary to understand

82. See generally Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence of
Consequential Thought: Evidence from Neuroscience, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y
LONDON B 1797, 1799–1802 (2004).
83. Id. at 1797.
84. Id. at 1800–01.
85. Id. at 1802 (defining adolescents as the period of life between puberty
and adulthood).
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the words used and the rights provided in the Miranda warning.
Professor Thomas Grisso assessed both juvenile and adult
comprehension of the vocabulary and rights expressed in the Miranda
warning, as well as juvenile and adult awareness of the purpose and
importance of the rights expressed in the statement, in order to
perform a comparative analysis between the two groups. 86 The study
showed that juveniles’ comprehension of the six key words used in the
Miranda warning was significantly lower than that of the adults. When
given an exam to test Miranda-related vocabulary comprehension,
60.1% of adult participants achieved the highest possible score
compared to only 33.2% of juvenile participants. 87 Also, juveniles
demonstrated a complete misunderstanding of at least one crucial
word 63.3% of the time, in comparison to 37.3% of adults. 88
The juvenile participants’ understanding of the purpose and
importance of the rights given during the Miranda warning were also
significantly lower than those of the adults. Only 27.6% of juveniles
received the highest score of comprehension of the rights compared
to 62.7% of the adults. 89 Grisso explains that “The most significant
conclusion to be drawn from these differences . . . is that as a class,
juveniles younger than fifteen years of age failed to meet both the
absolute and relative (adult) standards for adequate comprehension of

86. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980). Grisso explains that three samples of juveniles and two samples
of adults were used to conduct the study:
The juveniles ranged in age from 10 to 16, with about 20% aged 13 or younger; 60%
were males, nearly three-quarters were white, and 48% were middle or upper-middle
class (the remainder being lower-middle, lower class, or unclassifiable). About 20% of
the juveniles had no prior court referrals, and 25% had five or more prior referrals.
About one-third had been referred for one or more felony charges in the past. A wide
range of IQ scores was obtained, 11% of the juveniles having scores of 70 or below
and 22% having scores above 100.
Among the adult ex-offenders, 40% were ages 17-22 (mean age = 25.5, range = 1750), 79% were male, 58% were black, and 12% were from the middle class or a higher
socioeconomic level. About one-third were on parole for their first arrest since having
passed the statutory age of juvenile court jurisdiction (mean adult arrests = 4.0; mean
felony arrests = 2.4). Approximately 14% attained IQ scores of 70 or below, and 18%
had scores above 100.
The adult non-offender sample had similar demographic proportions.
Id. at 1149 nn.68–69.
87. Id. at 1154.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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their Miranda rights.” 90 It can be easily deduced from such results that
many juveniles simply do not completely understand the message of
the Miranda warning. Given that the Supreme Court has established
that Miranda waivers must be made “knowingly,” 91 this lack of
knowledge casts serious doubt on juveniles’ ability to make a valid
Miranda waiver.
Along with a still-developing brain that makes it unlikely that
juveniles will meet the “knowing and intelligent” requirement for a
valid Miranda waiver, juveniles are still maturing in their psychosocial
development. 92 This is problematic because evidence suggests that a
juvenile’s still-maturing psychosocial abilities could hinder the
juvenile’s capacity to meet the “voluntary” requirement for a legal
waiver. 93 For example, the Roper court cited a study on adolescent
psychosocial development to justify its reasoning that it is a violation
of the Eighth Amendment to give persons under the age of eighteen
the death penalty, in part because “juveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures.” 94 This same
study also explains that juveniles’ immature psychosocial development
affects the outcomes of their decision-making. 95 The analysis explains
that even if adolescents have mental abilities that are relatively equal
to that of an adult, the decisions they make will greatly differ because
of psychosocial immaturity. 96 The study also states that “cognitive
capacities shape the process of decision making, [and] psychosocial
immaturity can affect decision-making outcomes.” 97
Psychosocial development affects decision-making outcomes
because psychosocial factors influence the values and preferences
adolescents place on decisions. The four psychosocial factors that
shape adolescent decision outcomes are “(a) susceptibility to peer
influence, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk, (c) future

90. Id. at 1152.
91. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
92. Psychosocial is “[a] term referring to the mind’s ability, consciously or unconsciously,
to adjust and relate the body to its social environment.” Psychosocial, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MED. (4th ed. 2011).
93. See Grisso, supra note 43; see also Steinberg & Scott, supra note 68; King, supra
note 70.
94. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
95. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 68, at 1011–12.
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis in the original).
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orientation, and (d) the capacity for self-management.” 98 According
to the results of the study, an adolescent who lacks maturity in
psychosocial development, even one with a mature intellectual
process, does not understand the ramifications of his or her decisions
as clearly as an adult. 99 If, as required by Gault, “special caution”
should be given to confessions and admissions of juveniles, 100 then
such a lack in “decisional making” is especially significant when it
comes to juveniles deciding whether or not to waive Miranda rights 101
because juveniles in this situation are asked to make an adult decision
while lacking the decision-making ability of an adult.
Juveniles’ immaturity in psychosocial development also causes
them to be more compliant102 and suggestible 103 during police
interrogations. Consequently, juveniles are more willing than adults
to waive their Miranda rights. A study assessing juveniles’ abilities and
competence to participate in the legal process (in comparison to
adults), found that “[a]dolescents are more likely than young adults
to make choices that reflect a propensity to comply with authority
figures, such as confessing to police rather than remaining silent.”104
In fact, about one-half of the juveniles (age eleven to fourteen) in the
study thought confession to police was the best choice, while only
one-fifth of the eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds would have made
the same choice. 105
In another study investigating how age and suggestibility affected
the participants’ willingness to take responsibility for an act they did

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967).
101. Grisso, supra note 43, at 361 (stating that a juvenile’s “psychosocial immaturity may
affect a young person’s decisions, attitudes, and behavior . . . that may be quite important to
how they make choices, interact with police, relate to their attorneys, and respond to the
trial context”).
102. “Compliance is ‘a subject’s tendency to go along with instructions and directions
without actual acceptance of the premises.’” Kimberly Larson, Improving the “Kangaroo Courts”:
A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles’ Waiver of Miranda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 629, 657
n.163 (2003) (quoting Matthew B. Johnson & Ronald C. Hunt, The Psycholegal Interface in
Juvenile Assessment of Miranda, 18 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 17, 24 (2000) (defining
compliance as used in psychological literature)).
103. Suggestibility is “how a subject’s memory and beliefs are influenced and manipulated
during interrogation.” Id. at 657 n.164 (quoting THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF
RIGHTS 106 (1981) (defining suggestibility as used in psychological literature)).
104. Grisso, supra note 43, at 357 (alteration in original).
105. Id. at 336, 351.
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not commit, 106 “69% of the participants ‘falsely confessed[,]’” with
minor children more likely to take responsibility than young adults.107
Additionally, the youngest participants of the study, twelve and
thirteen-year-olds, “asked the fewest questions or made the fewest
comments” before signing a false confession. 108 Sixty-five percent of
this age group signed the false confession without saying a word,
which “suggests that the youngest participants were particularly prone
to be compliant with authority without even questioning it.” 109 Such
a study illustrates why scientists for years have believed “[o]bedience
to authority [figures] is a powerful phenomenon” 110 and why research
consistently indicates that people are willing to obey authority figures
because of their status as an authority. 111
The fact that a juvenile’s brain is still developing makes it doubtful
that an adolescent is capable of a “knowing and intelligent” Miranda
waiver. Along with a still growing brain, the juvenile’s ongoing
psychosocial development causes the juvenile to be more compliant
and susceptible during interrogation. The juvenile’s likelihood of
being complacent and susceptible to authority makes it uncertain that
a juvenile can make a “voluntary” waiver. These two elements
combined render it improbable that juveniles have the capacity to
meet the standards for a valid Miranda waiver.
V. INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY APPROACH
In Fare v. Michael, the Court explained that an inquiry into all the
circumstances surrounding an interrogation should be made to
determine if an accused person made a valid Miranda wavier. 112 Such
an inquiry “includes evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience,
education, background, and intelligence,” as well as the juvenile’s
106. Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not
Committed: The Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 141 (2003) (citing a
study where participants from three age groups were tested: twelve- and thirteen-year-olds,
fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds, and young adults. They were led to believe they had crashed a
computer, when they in fact had not, to see who would falsely confess.).
107. Id. at 151.
108. Id. at 150–51.
109. Id. at 151.
110. Id. at 152 (alteration in original) (referencing ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE:
SCIENCE AND PRACTICE (3d ed.1993); STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN
EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974)).
111. Id.
112. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
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capacity to understand the warning, his or her constitutional rights,
and the consequences of the waiver. 113 Thirty-four states and the
District of Columbia apply the totality of the circumstances approach
set forth in Fare with little to no alteration. 114 Seventeen states apply a
presumption that, until a specified age, juveniles cannot waive their
Miranda rights without consulting with either a parent, an “interested
adult,” or an attorney, or outside the presence of a parent. 115 An
“interested adult” is usually defined as the parent, guardian, close
family member, or attorney of the juvenile. If a child is over the
specified age and decides to waive his or her rights, the totality
approach is then applied to decide if the waiver was properly made.
Apart from the developmental problems discussed above in Part
IV, an additional problem with the factors used to determine if
juveniles have “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently” waived their
Miranda rights is that courts often fail to distinguish which factors
should carry the most weight. Should a child’s age be the determining
factor, or should the circumstances surrounding the interrogation
ultimately shape the court’s decision? Juvenile court judges make
these decisions according to their own interpretation of Fare and
individual feelings regarding which factor should be given priority.116
Because each judge brings his or her own experience and opinions to
a case, decisions about juvenile Miranda waivers are highly variable.117

113. Id.
114. King, supra note 70, at 452–53 (listing thirty-five states and the District of Columbia
applying the totality of the circumstances test resulting from Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,
725 (1979)). I have not included West Virginia because the state enacted W. VA. CODE ANN. §
49-4-701 (West 2016) declaring statements made by juveniles under fourteen while “in
custody” are not admissible unless counsel is present, and statements made by juveniles age
fourteen to sixteen who are “in custody” are not admissible without the presence of counsel or
an informed parent or custodian.
115. King, supra note 70 at 451–52 (listing fourteen states where age of the juvenile is a
factor when determining the validity of a Miranda waiver). I have added three additional states,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, for a total of seventeen. Pennsylvania, PA. R.J.C.P.
152 (stating that juveniles must be fourteen or older to waive their right to counsel); West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-701 (West 2016) (stating that statements made by juveniles
under fourteen while “in custody” are not admissible unless counsel is present, and statements
made by juveniles age fourteen to sixteen who are “in custody” are not admissible without the
presence of counsel or an informed parent or custodian); and Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. §
938.23 (West 2015) (stating that a juvenile age fifteen and older can waive the right to counsel).
116. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 118–19 (1999).
117. Id.
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One of the many factors articulated in Fare is the age of the
juvenile defendant. 118 Court decisions vary in the amount of deference
given to the age of a juvenile who has waived Miranda rights. Courts
in some states conclude that the juvenile’s young age is not enough to
invalidate a waiver—children as young as eleven have been held to
have the capacity to give a valid waiver, even if no parent was
present. 119 Other state courts attach great significance to the juvenile’s
age when deciding the validity of a waiver, but, even then, age alone
is usually not enough to invalidate a waiver. 120
The following discussion compares how two different state courts
addressed the importance of age, thereby illustrating how the relative
significance assigned to the age factor influenced the courts’ respective
decisions. The examination of two cases, In re Jerrell C.J. 121 and In re
Joseph H., 122 provides a small window into the immense discretion
juvenile courts have in deciding how much weight to give to an
adolescent’s age when deciding if a waiver is valid.
In re Jerrell provides an example in which the juvenile’s age was a
strong factor weighing against the voluntariness of the juvenile’s
Miranda waiver. 123 In Jerrell, a fourteen year-old’s confession to taking
part in an armed robbery was ruled to be involuntary under the
totality of the circumstances approach. 124 The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin recognized the importance of age when determining
voluntariness but stated that age was “not necessarily dispositive.”125
The court further showed its unwillingness to make age the definitive

118. West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968) restates the relevant factors
related to the totality of the circumstances approach set up by the Supreme Court in Gault:
Factors considered by the courts in resolving this question include: 1) age of the
accused; 2) education of the accused; 3) knowledge of the accused as to both the
substance of the charge, if any has been filed, and the nature of his rights to consult
with an attorney and remain silent; 4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or
allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; 5) whether the accused was
interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; 6) methods used in
interrogation; 7) length of interrogations; 8) whether vel non the accused refused to
voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and 9) whether the accused has
repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date.
119. King, supra note 70 at 456–57.
120. Id. at 458.
121. 699 N.W.2d 110 (Wis. 2005).
122. 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 171 (Ct. App. 2015).
123. In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d at 116–17.
124. Id. at 113.
125. Id. at 116–17.
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reason for invalidating a waiver by declining “to adopt a per se rule,
excluding in-custody admissions from any child under the age of 16
who has not been given the opportunity to consult with a parent or
interested adult.” 126 Besides age, the court took into account the
juvenile’s education and intelligence, prior experience with law
enforcement, and the “pressures and tactics” used by the police during
the interrogation before concluding that the confession was invalid.127
In her concurring opinion, however, Chief Justice Abrahamson
argued that the court should adopt a per se rule excluding confessions
by children under the age of sixteen who were not given the
opportunity to consult with a parent or interested adult. 128 Justice
Abrahamson cites eight different reasons for adopting such a per se
rule, 129 several of which align with the issues discussed in Part IV.
These reasons include both the idea that a juvenile’s still developing
brain permits only a minimal understanding of Miranda rights, and
also concerns about juveniles’ inherent “propensity to confess
to police.” 130
Both the majority opinion and Justice Abrahamson’s concurring
opinion in Jerrell agree that age is an important factor in determining
whether a juvenile’s waiver is voluntary. 131 However, the two opinions
differ on how much weight to assign age when deciding the validity
of a juvenile’s waiver. The majority opinion states the age of the
juvenile is not “dispositive” but rather a “critical factor” in
determining a voluntary waiver. 132 In contrast, Justice Abrahamson
believes age is so crucial that she wants to “adopt a per se rule
excluding in-custody admissions from any child under the age of 16
who has not been given the opportunity to consult with a parent or
interested adult.” 133 These differing opinions within the same court
decision regarding the significance of age when scrutinizing Miranda
waivers illustrates the nearly impossible task that courts face when they
are asked to make consistent and reliable judgements using the
totality approach.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
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Id. at 124.
Id. at 133–38.
Id. at 135–36.
Id. at 116, 133.
Id. at 116–17.
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While the Wisconsin court found the juvenile’s age to be of great
importance, other states do not consider age to be a substantial factor
when deciding if a waiver is admissible. One such state is California,
where a ten-year-old’s Miranda waiver and subsequent confession was
upheld by the California Court of Appeals in In re Joseph H. 134 Joseph
was removed from his biological mother and placed with his father at
the age of three or four because he had been physically abused,
severely neglected, and “sexually abused by his mother’s boyfriend.”135
Joseph’s situation remained dire at his father’s house—his father was
addicted to drugs and would lose control if he was drunk or high and
start to beat Joseph. 136 On one such occasion, after beating Joseph and
other members of the family, Joseph’s father “threatened to remove
all the smoke detectors in the house and burn the house down, while
the family slept.” 137 That night, after his father fell asleep on the couch,
Joseph took a loaded gun that was in the house, went downstairs, and
shot his father in the head. 138 Joseph was subsequently tried,
committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice, and confined to a secure
facility for a maximum of forty years to life. 139
On appeal, Joseph argued that his Miranda waiver and subsequent
confession were involuntary because of his lack of understanding of
his rights partly due to his young age. 140 In deciding that Joseph’s
waiver was voluntary, the court recognized that while age “may be a
factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession. . . . [I]t cannot
be said that a juvenile cannot waive constitutional rights as a matter of
law. It is a factual matter to be decided by the trial judge in each
case.” 141 While the court admitted that special caution should be taken
when determining if a juvenile’s confession is voluntary, it went on to
acknowledge that “absent coercive conduct by police, and despite his
young age, his ADHD, and low-average intelligence,” Joseph was able
to voluntarily waive his rights. 142

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

188 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 171, 176, 185–87 (Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 176.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 185–86.
Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
Id. at 187.
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In explaining its decision that Joseph’s Miranda waiver was valid,
the California court placed more weight on police conduct during an
interrogation than the age of the juvenile. Despite the fact that the
court recognized, in a footnote, research recommending that juveniles
are incompetent to waive their Miranda rights because of age and lack
of development, it decided to ignore such research because none was
presented at trial or on appeal. 143
These two cases, one from Wisconsin and one from California,
demonstrate the varied and inconsistent application of age
consideration—one of at least nine factors 144 typically considered in
the Fare totality of the circumstance approach. Such unpredictability
when it comes to deciding if a juvenile has made a valid waiver does
not meet the Gault standard that “special caution” 145 and the “greatest
care” 146 should be given when deciding whether juveniles have made
a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” waiver of their rights.
Nevertheless, some might argue that the totality of the
circumstances is the best approach for evaluating juvenile Miranda
waivers because it gives the courts flexibility and discretion. The Gault
court faced such a question of discretion when deciding whether to
decree stricter due process procedures in the juvenile process.147 Until
Gault, states were given wide discretion on what procedural rights
were given to juveniles. 148 Such discretion allowed the state to insert
itself, when needed, into the juvenile’s life to protect the child’s
interest. 149 The problem, the Gault court found, with giving the
state such discretion was that “unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and procedure.” 150
The Gault court reasoned that the juvenile court’s deviation
“from established principles of due process” caused “arbitrariness”
rather than “enlightened procedure.” 151 I would assert that the same
can be said about the inconsistent way the totality of the circumstances

143.
144.
note 118.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968); see factors cited supra
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 13–14.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18–19.
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approach is applied to juvenile Miranda waivers. The discretion given
to courts in applying the totality approach does not provide as high a
standard and protection as a set and clear rule stating juveniles cannot
waive their constitutional rights without first consulting an attorney
would provide. Yet, this higher standard would be more in keeping
with the “greatest care” criteria set by Gault because such a set
procedure gives juveniles the utmost protection against
invalid waivers.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
A credible substitute to the totality approach is a fixed procedural
requirement that juveniles must first consult with an attorney before
making a valid waiver. In deciding to evaluate whether a juvenile had
waived his or her Miranda rights with the same totality of the
circumstances approach used for adults, the Fare Court considered the
adult approach to be “adequate.” 152 The Court went on to explain that
one reason it implemented the adult approach was because it could
“discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required.” 153
Such lack of persuasive reasoning might have been the case in 1979
when Fare was decided, but, as demonstrated above, modern scientific
research provides many persuasive reasons why the totality approach
should be abandoned when it comes to determining the validity of
juvenile Miranda waivers. 154
In Fare, the Court rejected the juvenile’s request to see his
probation officer as an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right
because asking to see a probation officer was not the equivalent of
asking for an attorney. 155 The court reasoned that a probation officer
is not in the same position as a lawyer to give the legal assistance
needed to protect such constitutional rights. 156 In other words, there
is no comparable substitute for the legal advice an attorney can give in
such a circumstance. The Court went on to emphasize:
[T]he lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because
of his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client
undergoing custodial interrogation. Because of this special ability of

152. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
153. Id.
154. For studies, reasoning, and analysis of why the totality approach should be abandoned,
see Parts III–IV and accompanying footnotes.
155. Fare, 442 U.S. at 718–19.
156. Id. at 722.
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the lawyer to help the client preserve his Fifth Amendment rights
once the client becomes enmeshed in the adversary process, the
Court found that “the right to have counsel present at the
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege under the system” established by the Court.
Moreover, the lawyer’s presence helps guard against overreaching by
the police and ensures that any statements actually obtained are
accurately transcribed for presentation into evidence. 157

Thus, according to the Supreme Court, no one is better able to
protect the constitutional rights of an accused person than a lawyer
who has been trained to do so. Therefore, a juvenile should not be
able to waive his or her rights without first consulting with an attorney.
While some states have already legislatively or judicially required
the presence of an interested adult for a juvenile to be able to make a
valid waiver, 158 that approach is insufficient to protect the juvenile’s
rights. The idea behind having an interested adult present is that the
adult will help protect juveniles by decreasing the coercive
environment of an interrogation and give the juvenile an advocate
who better understands the juvenile’s rights and the consequences of
waiving those rights. 159
While having an interested adult with the juvenile is a laudable
idea, it is unlikely to bring about the desired effect. Psychologists have
understood for some time that the presence of such an adult may not
help at all and, in fact, could actually hurt the juvenile’s likelihood of
comprehending and asserting his or her rights. 160 Furthermore, one
study demonstrated that nearly three-fourths of parents thought that
children should not be allowed to withhold information from the
police if the child was suspected of a crime. 161 A parent’s belief that a
child should not withhold information from the police could put even

157. Id. at 719 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469–70 (1966)).
158. For a listing of the states that require an interested adult to be present for a valid
waiver see supra note 115 and accompanying text.
159. Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and the Right
to Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 105,
117 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (describing states’ reason for the
interested adult rule).
160. Larson, supra note 102, at 654 (quoting Thomas Grisso & C. Pomiciter,
Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 321, 340 (1977)) (finding parental presence did not increase frequency of
children’s assertion of rights to the same level as found with adults).
161. Grisso, supra note 86, at 1163.
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more coercive pressure on the child to waive his or her rights. Also, a
parent who is called to the police station might be embarrassed, angry
with the child, or want the child to learn a lesson by forcing the child
to talk to the police. 162 In another study, more than two-thirds of
parents who were actually present when their children were asked to
waive their rights before an interrogation offered no comments or
advice to their children. 163
In Fare, the Court stated that one reason it did not consider the
request by the juvenile to speak to his probation officer to be an
invocation of his Miranda rights was because the probation officer
was likely to offer advice that “would contrast sharply with the
interests of the juvenile.” 164 The Court went on to rationalize that a
probation officer would likely advise the juvenile to cooperate with
the police while an attorney “might well advise his client to remain
silent.” 165 The basic philosophy behind having an interested adult or
parent with the juvenile when making a waiver of rights is that such
an adult would look out for the child and make sure decisions made
are in the best interest of the child. As the aforementioned studies
suggest, however, an interested adult is unlikely to advise a child to
remain silent and refuse to waive his or her rights. Instead, it is likely
that, like the probation officer in Fare, an interested adult’s advice
“would contrast sharply” 166 with the interests of the accused juvenile.
Thus, having an interested adult or parent present does not provide
the juvenile with adequate constitutional protection.
The best way to protect children and to assure that they
understand their constitutionally protected rights is to require that
they consult with an attorney before waiving their rights. As stated
above, the Fare Court stressed that “the lawyer is the one person to
whom society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of
[a] person in his dealings with the police and courts.” 167 Likewise, in
discussing statements and confessions made by juveniles to the police,
the Gault Court stated:
162. See Grisso & Pomiciter, supra note 41, at 340 (listing the reasons that parents may
force their children to talk to police, which include anger, teaching obedience to authority,
emphasizing responsibility, and the hope that leniency will be given for a confession).
163. Grisso, supra note 86, at 1163.
164. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 721 (1979).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 719.
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If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an
admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that
the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not
coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of
ignorance of rights. 168

Both of these Supreme Court decisions point to the fact that having
an attorney present ensures that the juveniles’ rights will be protected
and that the “greatest care” has been taken.
States and advocates of juveniles’ rights will likely face opposition
to such a standard. For example, when the state of Illinois tried to pass
legislation that would prohibit juvenile Miranda waivers until after the
accused had spoken with an attorney, 169 police groups in Illinois
adamantly opposed the bill since it required an attorney to be present
during police interrogations of juveniles. 170 The police likely opposed
such added protection because it could hamper their investigations
and reduce the amount of information acquired through juvenile
interrogations, especially given that attorneys are likely to advise their
clients to remain silent. 171 However, as Kenneth J. King, a practitioner
of juvenile justice, asserts: “If this is the cost of protecting children, so
be it; there is always a cost to protecting the rights of the accused.” 172
Furthermore, as was discussed in Part IV of this Comment, the
information that juveniles provide the police is unlikely to be
trustworthy because juveniles are more likely to falsely confess to a
crime. 173 Also, the Gault case points out that admissions and
confessions of juveniles should be made outside the presence of
counsel only for a “permissible reason.” 174 The police objections to the
presence of counsel on assumed or possible hindrances they might face
in interrogating juveniles do not meet the Supreme Court mandate of
a “permissible reason.” The Gault decision could be interpreted to
168. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (emphasis added).
169. Larson, supra note 102, at 661–62 (referencing Jennifer Walters, Note, Illinois’
Weakened Attempt to Prevent False Confessions by Juveniles: The Requirement of Counsel for the
Interrogation of Some Juveniles, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 487, 513–14 (2001) (relating to opposition
encountered by Illinois legislature)).
170. Id. at 662; see Walters, supra note 169, at 514 (discussing political pressure by police
groups in order to prevent the proposed legislature).
171. Grisso, supra note 86, at 1163.
172. King, supra note 70, at 475–76.
173. See supra pp. 115–17 (providing support of juveniles’ compliancy, suggestibility, and
willingness to falsely confess during discussions with the police).
174. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
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suggest that possible “permissible reason[s]” for a juvenile’s
confession to be made outside the presence of counsel should be
limited to confessions made by older juveniles and confessions made
by juvenile’s accompanied by parents or guardians, since these are the
only two circumstances mentioned by the Court. 175
In summary, the best way to ensure that juveniles’ rights are
protected is to mandate that they consult with an attorney before
waiving their rights. The totality of the circumstances approach set
forth in Fare is no longer “adequate,” and allowing a juvenile to
consult with an attorney before making a waiver is a reasonable
alternative to the totality approach.
CONCLUSION
The great author and civil rights activist Maya Angelou is often
attributed with having said, “I did then what I knew how to do. Now
that I know better, I do better.” 176 This phrase could easily sum up the
evolution and progression of the juvenile justice system. For centuries,
children were viewed simply as small adults. The writings of William
Blackstone began to change this perception of children and helped
lessen their legal culpability. 177 The advancement of child protection
and the creation of the juvenile court system in the early 1900s further
improved how children were treated in the American legal system.
Even more changes were seen in the juvenile court following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gault. 178 With the help of the Gault
decision, juvenile courts began to better understand and protect the
rights of accused juveniles by mandating a stricter adherence to due
process of law.
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the legal rights of juveniles
have followed this progressive trend. The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Constitution in accordance with “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 179
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In other words, when the Supreme Court sees evidence that society
knows better, its decisions will reflect the evolution among the people.
An example of this jurisprudence is evidenced in the Roper Court’s
abolition of the juvenile death penalty. 180 Before 1987, there was no
ban stopping a juvenile from receiving a death sentence and being
executed. 181 On November 9, 1987, the Supreme Court decided that
juveniles under the age of sixteen could not be given the death
penalty. 182 The age at which someone can be given the death penalty
was later raised to eighteen by the Supreme Court in 2005. 183 The
Roper Court explained that there was evidence of “a national
consensus against juvenile executions” and that “today our society
views juveniles as ‘categorically less culpable that the
average criminal.’” 184
Just as society knew better with respect to juveniles and the death
penalty, society is now more informed about the development of the
brain and adolescents’ still-maturing psychosocial characteristics. As
shown above, the still-changing brain and psychosocial features hinder
an adolescent’s ability to make a knowing and intelligent Miranda
waiver. Added to this is the fact that juveniles are more compliant and
susceptible to authority figures, which makes a voluntary waiver
unlikely. These advancements, combined with the indeterminacy of
the totality of the circumstances approach, suggest that the totality
approach is no longer an acceptable method of protecting the
constitutional rights of juvenile defendants. A better and more
thorough way of protecting juveniles accused of crimes is to mandate
that they consult with an attorney before waiving their rights.
Allowing juveniles to consult with an attorney before waiving their
constitutionally protected rights would provide juveniles the
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heightened protection they deserve and ensure the validity of their
waivers. The legal system now knows better how to protect juveniles—
therefore, it should do better.
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